Overview
Head Start TTADP is the Office of Head Start’s Training and Technical Assistance Data Portal, a US Department of Health and Human Services application. Access is scoped by region: a user holds read/write permissions in the specific regions they are assigned, and records (activity reports, communication logs, recipient PII) belong to a region.
Two endpoints got the authorization key wrong. Instead of checking the caller against the region the target record belongs to, they checked the caller against a region the client supplied - a field in the request body in one case, a segment of the URL in the other - and then fetched the record by its id with no region predicate. The two keys are independent, so a user with access in one region passes the check by naming their own region while pointing the id at another region’s record. This is the classic broken-object-level-authorization shape (CWE-639 / CWE-862): the gate guards one value, the data access uses another.
Both were reported under coordinated disclosure and fixed in the same change (PR #4124), deployed to production on 2026-11-10.
| Advisory | Endpoint | Direction | CVSS:3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-9r9x-g862-525c | POST /api/activity-reports/objectives |
Write (integrity) | 6.4 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N) |
| GHSA-q859-79hf-rpr3 | GET /api/communication-logs/region/:regionId/log/:id |
Read (PII disclosure) | 6.4 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) |
Both Medium severity, CWE-639 + CWE-862, fixed in HHS/Head-Start-TTADP PR #4124 (merge
3a63737a8), production tag prod-e630b11afd, 2026-11-10.
Root cause
Write: objectives endpoint keyed to a body field
POST /api/activity-reports/objectives (src/routes/activityReports/index.js) runs with no
authorization middleware; the handler gates on a region taken from the body, then writes to a
different body field, activityReportId, that it never validates against that region:
const { objectivesWithoutGoals, activityReportId, region } = req.body;
...
if (!authorization.canWriteInRegion(parseInt(region, DECIMAL_BASE))) {
res.sendStatus(403);
return;
}
const report = await ActivityReportModel.findByPk(activityReportId); // never checked against `region`
await saveObjectivesForReport(objectivesWithoutGoals, report);
region and activityReportId are independent client inputs. The gate checks region; the write
targets activityReportId. saveObjectivesForReport does not re-check the report’s region either,
so a user with write in region A sends region: A (passes the gate) and an activityReportId from
region B, and the objectives are written to the region-B report. The sibling
POST /api/activity-reports/goals has the same split.
Read: communication-log endpoint keyed to the URL region
GET /api/communication-logs/region/:regionId/log/:id, handled by communicationLogById
(src/routes/communicationLog/handlers.ts), authorizes against the URL regionId and fetches
the log by id only:
getAuthorizationByLogId -> new Policy(user, Number(regionId), log) // regionId is from the URL
logById(Number(id)) -> CommunicationLog.findOne({ where: { id } }) // by id only, no region predicate
Policy.canReadLog() -> user.permissions.some(p => p.regionId === this.regionId && READ)
// this.regionId is the URL region, not log.regionId
The LIST endpoints scope by the log’s real region (withRegion), and update/delete gate on the
creator. Only this read path builds no scope on the log’s own region - the decisive asymmetry - so
canReadLog() is satisfied by the caller’s own region while logById returns a log from any region,
eager-loading recipient PII, files and notes.
Preconditions and impact
The only precondition is an authenticated account with read (for the log) or write (for the objectives) permission in a single region - an ordinary low-privilege user. Report and log ids are sequential integers, so target records are enumerable.
- Read (communication logs): any user with READ in one region can read any communication log in any region by id, disclosing recipient PII, uploaded files and staff notes across regions.
- Write (activity-report objectives): any user with WRITE in one region can create or modify objectives (title, status) on any activity report in any region, tampering with federal Head Start report content.
# Write IDOR - attacker has read/write in region 1 only; target report 777200 is in region 2:
POST /api/activity-reports/objectives
{"region":1,"activityReportId":777200,"objectivesWithoutGoals":[{"title":"INJECTED-CROSSREGION-OBJ",...}]}
-> 200 # objective is linked to report 777200, whose regionId is 2
# Read IDOR - attacker has READ in region 15 only; victim log 999 is in region 200:
GET /region/15/log/999 -> 200 # returns the region-200 log and its PII
GET /region/200/log/999 -> 403 # same user, log's real region: correctly denied (the control)
Both were confirmed against the real shipped handlers and policies: the write case on a minimal
Express harness with the real transactionWrapper against the full migrated schema on PostgreSQL;
the read case through the project’s own Jest harness exercising the real communicationLogById and
Policy.canReadLog. The only attacker input is the request. The read case carries its own control -
the same user asking for the log’s real region is denied - which proves authorization is keyed on
the supplied region, not the record’s.
The fix
Fixed in PR #4124 (merge 3a63737a8), released to production on 2026-11-10 (prod-e630b11afd). Both
endpoints now authorize against the region the record actually belongs to. The objectives endpoint
loads the target report, requires the supplied region to match the report’s region, and checks write
access in that region before any write. The communication-log read endpoint now requires read access
in the region the log is saved under (mirroring the withRegion scope the list endpoints already
use); a log saved without a region takes its region from its recipients’ grants only when they all
share one, and is otherwise administrator-only.
The general lesson. Authorize against the key the data is actually fetched by. If the handler reads a record by
id, the access check must be derived from that record’s own owning region / tenant - never from a region the client also supplied, and never from a URL segment that the id can contradict. Any time the gate’s key and the query’s key are two independent inputs, they can be made to disagree.
Disclosure timeline
- 2026-11-10 - Reported under coordinated disclosure; advisories GHSA-9r9x-g862-525c and GHSA-q859-79hf-rpr3 opened (GitHub as CNA), reporter credited.
- 2026-11-10 - Fixed in PR #4124 (merge
3a63737a8) and deployed to production in tagprod-e630b11afdthe same day.
References
- Advisories: GHSA-9r9x-g862-525c (write IDOR), GHSA-q859-79hf-rpr3 (read IDOR). GitHub as CNA.
- Fix: HHS/Head-Start-TTADP PR #4124, merge commit
3a63737a8, production tagprod-e630b11afd. - CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. CWE-862: Missing Authorization.
Credit
Reported by Dilanka Kaushal Hewage (r3vpwnx) under coordinated disclosure.